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THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS’ 
“This law of the modern world, that power tends to expand indefinitely, 
and will transcend all barriers abroad and at  home, until met by superior 
forces, produces the rhythmic movement of History. . . . The  threatened 
interests were compelled to unite for the self-government of nationa, the 
toleration of religion, and the rights of men. And it is by the combined 
efforts of the weak, made under compulsion, to resist the reign of force and 
constant wrong, that, in the rapid change but slow progress of four hundred 
years, liberty has been preserved, and secured, and extended, and finally 
understood.” 
Lono AWN. 
HEN in the early days of the war the amateur poli- W tician observed that the futility of T h e  Hague  Confer- 
ence was not proved, he was expressing, more suo, a dis- 
torted political truth, Fo r  a t  T h e  Hague  the organism of 
a world-state had been disclosed; and the war, which is 
anarchy among states, demonstrated that the world-state 
had as yet no life. T h e  League of Nations is the attempt 
to frame that political organism in order that the inter- 
national spirit may find in it a home and an instrument; that 
is, a body. Fo r  the international mind is a new reality, and 
the old State cannot house it. 
“Nature made men citizens,” said Aristotle. But of what 
city? T o  what other men, and to  how many of them, are 
we “naturally’) bound in an association of which the object 
is government-that is, a t  the lowest estimate, the enforce- 
1 This paper by Miss Rose Sidgwick, prepared for delivery as a discourse 
at  the Rice Institute on the occasion of the visit of the British Educational 
Mission to that institution, has a peculiar and pathetic interest, for it is one 
of the last things Miss Sidgwick wrote. At the close of her tour in the 
United States as one of the seven members of the British Educational Mis- 
sion, and two days only before she was due to sail for England, she caught 
influenza, which developed into pneumonia, and she died a fortnight later 
in New York on December 28, 1918. 
This paper gives some indication of the loss she is to the world of thought, 
which, together with the tragic loss of her experience and wiadorn in carry- 
ing on the work of promoting interchange and understanding between uni- 
versity students and teachers on both sides of the Atlantic, cannot bc too 
deeply regretted.-C.F.E.S. 
53 
54 The League of Nations 
ment of order and elementary justice? I t  is habitually as- 
sumed that for modern times the “city’) of Aristotle is what 
is called indifferently the “country)) o r  the “State.” Yet 
that this should be so is in itself startling, for when Aristotle 
said “polis” he meant a town like Athens, as big as Ports- 
mouth, with less than a quarter of the population of Man- 
chester. T h e  frog is swollen to the size of a bull; is it 
certain that its anatomy is unchanged in the process? 
T h e  nation-state first realized itself generally in the six- 
teenth century, when Catholic unity was rent, and when 
Machiavelli had  taught the secular national governments 
that they should “suffer neither limit nor equality.” In 
England the doctrine bore fruit first in internal autocracy; 
the power which was formidable under Queen Elizabeth 
became intolerable under the Stuarts, and the three cen- 
turies intervening between James I and this year (1918) 
have seen the expansive power, of which Lord  Acton speaks, 
checked by the claim of subjects to “self-government, re- 
ligious toleration, and the rights of men.” Twenty years 
ago, English political thinkers felt so secure of liberty that 
the “State” had  again become an idea which claimed only 
enthusiastic reverence. W e  were taught that the State was 
perhaps the most potent of human forces for good, and the 
name called out from many their best effort and most ardent 
sacrifice. I t  summarized the conception of the public good 
set over against selfish private-mindedness, and of the 
righteous power of the whole over its parts. In short, we 
were trained to  identify the State with the civic body of 
which we were members; patriotism in this sense seemed 
the whole duty of a man. 
T h e  war revealed the flaws in this conception, which, 
though clear and easy, is by those very virtues limited to an 
imperfect view of the truth. T h e  shape given to the idea 
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of the State in Germany, especially in the debased popular 
form Bernhardi made current, would have repelled most 
Englishmen even if it had not been put in practice. If, as 
Treitschke says, “the State is the highest thing in the ex- 
ternal society of men,” there is no obligation beyond it, 
morals become identified with law, war is good, and inter- 
national projects are illusory. Such theories helped the 
liberal peoples to realize that the national polity does not 
wholly embody their own moral being; and already the mere 
shock of the fact  of war had branded on our minds the 
truth that “patriotism is not enough.” T h e  international 
mind suffered injury. But if the international spirit cannot 
be confined in the State, what political body can be found 
for  i t? 
There are those who think that only a world-state can 
logically be expected to fulfil the requirements of this 
wandering ghost that seeks a home; who believe that nation- 
alism and patriotism are provincial vulgarities, destined to  
be discarded. T o  them the League of Nations is useless 
because incomplete; it is scarcely a polity, for though it will 
have a permanent court of law and a “council of concilia- 
tion” which may possibly also legislate, it may well have no 
executive, and almost certainly will have no army, navy o r  
taxes. These, however, are deductive reasoners, who start 
from what seems desirable and pass by the road of logic to 
their inevitable goal. T h e  modest inductive historian, 
reasoning from what has been to what seems likely to  be, 
cannot shut his eyes to the achievements and the promise of 
the force of nationality; and if he is also an economist of 
human energy, he would prefer a scheme in which room is 
left for national specialization. Surely, he argues, local 
political life is a strength, not a weakness, to a nation; cities 
adorn and strengthen the State; and so may nationalities 
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fortify and enrich the League. A t  the same time it is essen- 
tial that it should be a chastened nationality; ex hypothesi, 
the power of each government is to recognize its barriers, 
acknowledge its equals, bow down to its superior, the whole. 
Whether or not the frog can reach the size of a bull and 
suffer no damage, he must never hope to  become the new 
Great Leviathan. 
A statesman who accepts the fact of nationalism on the 
one hand, yet feels the motion of the international mind on 
the other, sees that his a r t  of politics is discredited by world- 
anarchy. H e  sees further, with shame, that the world-soul 
is finding expression in other materials than his. Why, he 
may well ask himself, is there a “Universal Postal Union” 
with an international legislature (the Postal Congress) and 
administrative (the Postal Bureau) ; why is there an inter- 
national system to  regulate “the technical unity of railways,” 
the white slave traffic, the adoption for international mo- 
torists of “four international sign-posts,)’ an international 
union for the “suppression of useless noises,” and yet no 
worrd-organization for the most important of human activi- 
ties-politics ? 
N o r  will he, i f  he is a right-minded politician (the 
species is not extinct), be consoled when he observes that 
the churches suffer the same reproach: no branch of official 
Christianity keeps its unity unimpaired when its members 
are nationals of enemy states. H e  may even wonder 
whether an informal religious organization like the Student 
Christian Movement has not a more real international life 
than the churches. But here, as a cautious theorist, he 
ceases to  speculate on ethical tendencies, and turning to the 
past, which we are told is so still and plain a page of written 
wisdom, he studies the lesson of modern history. 
Fo r  four hundred years, Lord  Acton says in the pregnant 
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passage quoted above, national power has followed the law 
of its being and tried to expand, and has been checked by 
the combination of the weak. H e  has himself shown the 
inevitable connection between arbitrary home government 
and aggressive foreign policy : a connection which, when 
once suggested, is plainly to be traced in the attempts a t  
imperial domination made by Spain under Philip IT, and by 
France under Louis XIV, and again a century later by 
Napoleon.1 
Starting from Lord  Acton’s view that progress in liberty 
has come through resistance to such aggression, we may 
hope to  show also that the modern history of freedom leads 
toward a League of Nations as its natural fulfilment, and 
that only some such world-polity, however loosely con- 
structed, can house the world-soul implicit in the theory of 
democracy. And finally, since the study of these four cen- 
turies shows that in each case of aggression the tyrant and 
his victims alike aimed a t  unity-the one because expanding 
unity is the law of power, the other because in union alone 
is safety-the conviction is pressed upon us that a thirst for 
unity is the urgent force of modern politics; that the im- 
pulse of the weak toward union is sound; and that in the 
conqueror’s ambition lurks an implied dualism which fore- 
dooms his hopes to failure. 
I t  is the prerogative of some great men to combine in 
their own personality even the contradictory ideas of their 
times. In  Philip I1 were incarnate the conceptions of the 
supreme State and the Universal Church. Believing him- 
self, as Martin Hume says, to be “the junior partner with 
Providence,” he inevitably regarded the revolt of the Neth- 
11 do not think this is a misreading in facts. The likeness in idea and 
ambition between the domination of Philip and of Louis is too obvious to be 
missed; the progresJ in the art of combination aeerns to me equally convin- 
cing when once you look for it. 
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erlanders-Catholic and Protestant-as blasphemy, and 
his attempt to impose Catholic sovereigns on England and 
France as the plain duty of a faithful son of the Church. 
H e  bore the miscarriage of his political hopes with the 
same saintly fortitude as his own last illness-with the 
patience of one whose fortunes are linked to eternity. H i s  
sovereignty, in his own view, was scarcely even jure 
divino, for  it, and it alone on earth, apparently, was the 
power and authority of God. Thus its sanction was su- 
perior even to that of the Holy See, as was proved in 1556, 
when he crossed swords with Pope Paul IV, and worsted 
that fiery veteran; though Philip might fairly plead that the 
Pope was acting as a Neapolitan patriot rather than as 
St. Peter’s successor, for  he was allied not only with France 
but with the Grand Turk. 
Clearly then the dominion of Philip I1 could, in the na- 
ture of the case, “suffer neither limit nor equality,” until 
the rule of “God and Your Majesty” should be uncontested 
over all the earth. T h a t  the heretics should have, as his 
ambassador in England complained, less than their due 
share of troubles was only a trial of faith. 
In this first eruption of the modern State, the art  of pro- 
tecting liberty by combination was evidently not understood. 
Never was patriotism more heroic than that of the Dutch 
citizen soldiers who lost Haarlem and saved Leyden; never 
more ineffectual. N o r  were Englishmen behind in devotion 
or  initiative. English volunteers fought in the Netherlands, 
if the Nassau brothers fought a t  Moncontour; and Drake 
raided the ports of Spanish America long before war was 
declared between the governments. When Winter sailed 
in 1560 to help the Scots against the Guises, he had orders 
to pick a quarrel “as of his own hand.” And if govern- 
ments would not back their own men, neither did they back 
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one another. Even when the war was avowed in 1588, 
Howard  and the Dutch cooperated against Parma without 
any formal alliance. France, precipitated by the long arm 
of Spain into an eighth civil war, was linked by treaty with 
England since 1572, but after the death of the Duke of 
Anjou, no formal bond united the efforts of Henry  of 
Navarre with those of Maurice, Prince of Orange, until 
Ivry and the capture of Breda were triumphs some years 
old. Not until May  24, 1596, did a Triple Alliance, 
offensive and defensive, join Holland, France and England 
against their common foe. T h a t  day made possible a 
League of Nations. 
Defeated by England in the Channel, by Holland off 
Gibraltar, and flouted jointly and severally by both over all 
the seas of the world, Spain accepted her lesson and learned 
her place. No revolution effected the change, save that 
the great Philip made way for  the little. T h e  union of the 
weak had for that time frustrated the menace of a unity 
forced from without. 
Sixty years later the danger reappeared; Louis XIV, him- 
self half a Spaniard and the husband of a Spanish wife, 
flaunted before Europe the mantle of his great-grandfather, 
Philip 11. T h e  doctrine of the divine right of rulers in its 
complete form was set forth by him in word and act. T h e  
autocracy is as obvious in its internal as in its external con- 
sequences. T h e  king is the State. All organs of national 
life other than the monarchy crumble before him like houses 
when a mine is sprung ; and he meant that they should. He 
who curbed the Parliament of  Paris with a haughty word 
at  the age of fourteen, warned his son in the Memoirs 
written for his political guidance of the pitiful bondage suf. 
fered by a monarch (such as his cousin of England) who is 
“under the necessity of receiving laws from his subjects.” 
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“It  is inverting the order of things that subjects should de- 
termine or kings obey, . . . Of the many persons who 
compose . . . assemblies, the most ignorant . . . 
often . . , take the greatest liberties”; if you give them 
an inch, they take an ell; “for which reason a Prince who 
wishes to keep his people in lasting tranquillity, and be- 
queath his dignity unimpaired to  his successor, cannot too 
carefully repress this unruly audacity. . . . I t  is impos- 
sible that in the State you will rule after me, you should find 
any authority which is not proud to  derive from you its 
origin and form.” Hence the downfall of Protestant, 
Quietist, Jansenist ; hence also the unscrupulous foreign 
policy. F o r  though Bossuet, who taught Louis much of his 
political theory, saw and accepted the consequence of his 
own “Politique tirCe de l’ficriture Sainte”-that all other 
governments, even republics, have the same origin and 
sanction as the French monarchy-Louis in act denied this. 
H i s  assaults on the Spanish Netherlands and Holland, his 
thefts from the German princes, his appropriation of the 
entire inheritance of Spain, are not really logical applica- 
tions of the theory of Divine Right; they illustrate the ex- 
pansive tendency of power, and they roused a t  last the moral 
opposition of the neighbors. 
But Europe had forgotten the hardly learned lesson of 
1596. Louis’s occupation of French Flanders and of Lille 
excited protest indeed, and produced the Triple Alliance of 
the three Protestant nations. But the English Government 
of Charles I1 was cynical and the Swedish corrupt; Holland 
alone was in earnest, and incurred the wrath of the offended 
deity of France, a t  whose frown the alliance dissolved. 
Not till William 111 of Orange was in the saddle was the 
true policy of coalition unders tood;  he made it real; for him 
it was a sufficient life-work, and a sufficient claim to  the 
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gratitude of posterity, to have built up successively the 
coalition of 1672-8, the League of Augsburg, and the 
Grand Alliance. Marlborough took from William’s dying 
hand the arduous command in war and diplomacy of the 
union of allies, which in 1713 enforced peace. 
Turn  over another page of history. 
T h e  French Revolution destroyed for  France at  least the 
doctrine of the divine right of kings; indeed, it strove to 
banish both God and the king. Yet a conquering nation- 
alism survived, as characteristic of republican as of royal 
or  imperial France. In  1792 the republic declared war on 
England, and it was renewed after the peace, o r  rather 
truce, of Amiens in 1802. Two years later, again, the 
Consulate became an Empire, but the animosity of the k i n g  
doms allied against it was in no wise diminished. This  is 
entirely explicable. T h e  Allies of 1793 and 1803 were not 
really concerned with the government of France; it was less 
than nothing to them, or  so they believed, how the whirl- 
pool of democracy might seethe inside the French frontiers, 
so’ long as French troops did not invade neighboring lands. 
Only now, perhaps, have the course and consequences of the 
Russian Revolution impressed on Europe the full strange- 
ness of that other movement, a century and a quarter ago, 
when the armed missionarief of the Rights of Man  com- 
bined with their universalist doctrine an  exclusive nation- 
alism which even their Gallican logic has never seen to be 
inconsistent with the ultimate theory of democracy. T h e  
phenomenon is reproduced to-day in the “Union SacrCe.” 
And since Napoleon, like his republican predecessors, stood 
for  the “efficiency and splendor” of the State of France, he 
succeeded quite naturally to the national sovereignty. He 
led the armies to continual victory, extending the power of 
France toward Asia, grasping the greater par t  of Europe ; 
62 The League of Nations 
and the apostles of liberty, equality and fraternity felt no 
mortal shock. 
F o r  the third time, then, since the Reformation, the weak 
combined against the strong. In  the name of reaction, of 
order, subjection, established bounds, the conservatives of 
Europe made war  on behalf of international liberty-that 
is, of the rights of all the lesser against the greatest in the 
family of nations. 
T h e  fall of Napoleon revealed the weakness of this 
strange association of free and autocratic powers against 
liberal France. T h e  empires fell into their proper place in 
the Holy  Alliance, and England stood aside. But the 
Greek rebellion of 1827 called out the one great interna- 
tional idea evolved from the Napoleonic wars-a Concert 
of Europe, a self-elected Committee of Nations, which 
should act as the executive of the whole. On behalf of the 
whole, though in a halting and irregular fashion, Russia, 
France and England stepped between Greek and Turk  to 
see fair  play. And international law accepted even their 
use of force at  Navarino as “pacific,” because it was in the 
interests of the general order, like the arrest of a criminal. 
A t  the Congress of Paris in 1856 and of Berlin in 1 8 7 8  
the Committee of Europe was more fully apparent. T h e  
instability of their arrangements is a by-word of diplomacy, 
and it is sometimes said that the Concert died of its own 
futility in the end of the nineteenth century; yet surely it 
marks, in the evolution of the world’s polity, a stage be- 
tween the fleeting coalitions of war  and the permanent 
League of Nations. 
If this is a correct reading of the history of the last four 
hundred years, the efforts a t  world-dominion have all been 
spurred by the “torment of unity”; and against them unity 
has also been the only protection. Must we conclude that 
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the fact of political power dooms the world to an eternal 
dualism, an equilibrium forever unstable? 
It would seem that “Realpolitik” accepts dualism. Alike 
in Germany and England, imperial patriots have dreamed 
of  their own state as supreme, beneficent, dominant, awing 
into unity an obedient globe as Prussia has unified the 
German Empire, and dictating permanent peace. Such an 
international solution may well be called Utopian. I s  not 
this “realist” notion of “dictating peace” itself the merest 
will-o’-the-wisp? Dr .  Keate, it is recorded, in a sermon to 
Eton boys on the Beatitudes, told them, as his rhetorical 
enthusiasm grew, that if they were not pure in heart he 
would flog the whole school till they were. T h e  attempt to 
dictate peace is almost as promising a scheme. Apart  from 
psychological difficulties, however, such projects are based 
on a fundamental contradiction. T h e  imperialist thinker 
may aim at a Pax Romana, but as a realist he acknowledges 
that it must be won and preserved by force of arms. Nau- 
mann, the projector of a Central Europe strong enough to 
disregard the rest of the world, pictures the new Super- 
state as defended by two great trenches scored across the 
face of Europe, one running from the lower Rhine to the 
Alps, the other from the Baltic to the Danube, “either right 
or  left of Roumania.” But whether the world-power is 
conceived as a fortress protected by troops in shining 
armor, o r  as a maritime empire girdled with war-ships, 
political dualism is admitted. T h a t  is potential war, born 
of the preparation f o r  peace. It is also the denial of the 
supreme reality of the international mind; it is the Mani- 
chean heresy in politics. 
President Wilson, then, is the Augustine of political 
catholicity. H e  refuses to believe in the necessity and per- 
petuity of strife. I t  would be a bewildering universe in 
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which the impulse toward unity should go forward until the 
contending camps are reduced to two, and fail eternally to 
reduce two to one. H i s  scheme-for the League of Nations 
will hereafter be fathered on him-is a bold assertion of 
ultimate political unity. I t  is the effort to  build up an 
elastic world-state. I t  draws guidance and hope from 
American history. Wisdom, not mere necessity, federated 
the United States, and gave them a constitution firm enough 
to embody the instinct of unity, but loose enough to  leave 
room for local liberties. H o w  much less exacting must be 
the first union of nations, divided by history, language and 
patriotic sentiment ! 
Loose as the framework may be, its creation will estab- 
lish two vital principles. 
First, it admits that the international spirit must have a 
political, o r  rather super-political, body. This appears to 
be denied with prophetic passion by the Russian revolu- 
tionaries. They  are the boldest of political heretics, for 
they deny the existence of the great Leviathan, and feel no 
need to  create him if he does not create himself. Yet 
the priest of Leviathan told the world, and experience 
seems to confirm it, that apart from his god life would be 
“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” “Nature made 
men citizens.” T h e  evangelist of individualism will always 
seize men’s imagination, for he has hold of truth;  he bids 
them remember that they are men first, and citizens only 
afterward-or not a t  all. Toiling statesmen may well 
listen to  him, for he sees 
“that City’s shining spires 
W e  travel to.” 
But sometimes he is so dazzled by its light that he cannot 
see the next step of our common way: it is to the next step 
that President Wilson points. 
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T h e  other vital principle of the League of Nations ad- 
mitted now on all hands-admitted this May1 by the Times 
-is that the League is to be a League of all civilized pow- 
ers willing to enter it, “enemy” o r  “allied.” There  has 
been a counter-opinion urging that a League embracing 
Germany is unthinkable, o r  would be foredoomed to ruin. 
T h e  contrary, it is submitted, is the truth demonstrated by 
reason and history: a coalition can only confirm the cleavage 
which means perpetual strife; a League of Nations alone 
can preserve peace. 
I t  has been assumed in the foregoing argument that the 
human instinct for union is its own justification ; that it can- 
not be questioned, and need not be explained. Political 
speculation takes it for granted; a wide-spread i f  a weak 
ethical sentiment proclaims it well-nigh universal ; patriot- 
ism is only an artificial concentration of the same feeling 
within variable limits. And political theory has outrun 
political fact; for until the League of Nations is a reality 
there has been no habitation for the root-idea of democracy. 
T h e  spirit has struggled and wailed inside the bonds of 
nations like Ariel in his cloven pine. I t  made itself a tem- 
porary body in the Socialist “International”; but that, like 
the “lovely form” of T ru th  in Milton’s image, has been 
“hewn into a thousand pieces and scattered to the four 
winds.’’ Even i f  every joint and member should come to- 
gether again, they cannot yet represent the whole peoples, 
as the League of Nations must do i f  it is to  la.st. Here  
lies its gravest difficulty. There  is a natural reluctance 
during war to imagine an organization inside which Ger- 
many and Austria would work and live in harmony with 
Belgium and Serbia. H o w  can the lion and the lamb lie 
down together? T h e  League of Nations faces that prob- 
‘May, 1918. 
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lem: “when the lion shall eat straw like the ox,” there is 
place for him in the holy mountain. 
I t  is no accident that the free peoples have accepted the 
obligation to be the world’s police. T h e  desire that small 
powers may pursue their lawful occasions peaceably and un- 
threatened, is a mere and inevitable extension of the English 
conception of the liberty of the subject. Only where the 
practice of legal freedom is a habit of national life, can 
governments avoid the temptation to hector and bully in 
diplomacy, o r  to  dominate by war. 
“Realpolitik” has got to show that it can stand the 
human test of reality-Time. If free and voluntary unions 
prove to have bonds like those with which Burke credited 
our Empire, “light as air, but strong as links of iron,” and 
durable as human nature, and if the domination of one 
great power proves as transient in the future as in the past, 
the League born of liberty will be more real than the dreams 
of imperial patriots. 
T h e  whole thing was settled long ago by Socrates. I t  
was argued, by Callicles, that “nature herself intimates that 
it is just for the better to  have more than the worse, and 
the more powerful than the weaker. O n  what principle of 
justice did Xerxes invade Hellas, or his father the 
Scythians? These are the men who act . . . by 
Heaven! according to the law of nature. If there were a 
man who had sufficient force . . . the light of natural 
justice would shine forth.” Must he not be in a miserable 
plight whom the reputation of justice and temperance 
hinders from giving more power to his friends than to his 
enemies, even though he be a ruler in his city? But Socrates 
answers that he disagrees: and that, according to him, this 
is not the plan of the universe; “for he who desires to be 
happy must pursue justice and temperance, . . . not suf- 
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fering his lusts to be unrestrained, and in the never-ending 
desire to satisfy them leading a robber’s life. Such an one 
is a friend neither of God nor man; for he is incapable of 
communion (sharing), and he who is incapable of com- 
munion is incapable of friendship. And philosophers tell 
us, Callicles, that communion and friendship and orderliness 
and temperance and justice bind together heaven and earth 
and gods and men; and that this Universe is therefore 
called Cosmos, order, not disorder o r  misrule, my friend.” 
ROSE SIDGWICK. 
